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I. Introduction
Sixty years have passed since the Korean Armistice Agreement was concluded. Over the past decades, relationships among the former belligerent parties have changed dramatically; China has become the largest trading partner of South Korea with firm diplomatic ties and the US is building a new strategic partnership with China. Despite such seemingly flourishing exchanges and cooperation, the parties still remain under the armistice system because the Korean War is not over legally. Entering the new millennium, the relevant parties began trying to build permanent peace in the Korean peninsula, the first step of which should be replacing the current Armistice Agreement with a true peace treaty. As South Korean President Park Geun-hye declared an initiative for peaceful unification of Korea at Dresden, Germany on March 28, 2014, 1 the peacemaking process between the two Koreas is expected to be accelerated. In this course, however, the Chinese position as a signer of the Armistice may be questionable due to her highly political stance to the military actions, especially through volunteers during the Korean War. This research aims to analyze questions regarding the Chinese People's Volunteer Army ("CPVA") in the Korean War from an international legal perspective. As a newly tackled topic, it is intended to provide a precautionary examination of an issue that could haunt the eventual process of peacemaking on the Korean peninsula. This article consists of five parts including Introduction and Conclusion. Part two will examine the international legal causes of the Chinese military's intervention in the unusual form of volunteers. Whether the CPVA entering Korea was 'self-defense' will be analyzed here. Part three will cover various legal questions relating to armed hostilities in the Korean War. The CPVA's offensives, declaration of war, and belligerent status will be tackled in terms of international law. Part four will discuss the legal questions in the armistice negotiation. The POW-related issues and the CPVA's position in relation to the People's Republic of China ("PRC") in the Armistice will be analyzed. This paper has been written as of today, sixty years after the Armistice Agreement. However, international law, especially the law of war invoked here is mainly that of 1953. Additionally, this research will be carried out 'positively' with an international legal viewpoint. The author has endeavored to exclude any political or ideological views regarding the Korean War and the CPVA in this research. 
II. Casus Belli: Self-Defense?
In the beginning, the Chinese leaders did not want a deep commitment to Korean affairs. Beijing considered just limited involvement, including the transfer of about 12,000 native Koreans from the Chinese People's Army to the North Korean Army in 1950 2 and some moral support, such as propaganda. 3 Even the Indian Ambassador On October 14, 1950, the CPVA began covertly infiltrating about 180,000 men across the Yalu River south of which the UNF dominated the air, ground, and sea of the Korean battlefield. 13 They successfully carried out the infiltration through a nocturnal march with 'incredible camouflage' against aerial reconnaissance.
14 Soon after the CPVA entered Korea, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 498 stating that: "China itself has engaged in aggression in Korea" by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces. Although the General Assembly Resolution 498 recognized the CPVA's infiltration as 'aggression,' it would not have any legal binding force, but a nominal declaration because only the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining the peace and security of the international community. 26 Thus, in accordance with a strict legal interpretation, the CPVA's crossing the Yalu River might be regarded as "preemptive self-defense" 27 responding to the UNF crossing the 38 th parallel, without a full-scale armed attack on Chinese territory yet. Whether the CPVA's offensive was proportional to the UNF's military threat is a question, however. The full conditions for the self-defense would be completed with the following two incidents.
B. Blockade of the Taiwan Strait
The question of Taiwan was another cause for the Chinese intervention into the Korean conflict. Both Korea and Taiwan were points of related contention between China and the United States in East Asia.
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Shortly after war broke out in the Korean peninsula, on June 27, 1950, US President Harry Truman instantly ordered the US Navy's Seventh Fleet to blockade the Taiwan Strait. 29 Although the main objective of this action was seemingly to 'neutralize' the Strait for the US, 30 the seal-off would lead the Americans to discard the disengagement policy and intervene in Chinese domestic affairs again. 31 It was 26 UN Charter art. 24(1). Due to this limitation, the General Assembly adopted the so-called Uniting for Peace Resolution on November 3, 1950 which stated that: "…if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security…, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to The American blockade of the Taiwan Strait during the Korean War is the key to understanding the legal characteristics of the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. A 'blockade' is a "belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all nations from entering or exiting specified ports, airports, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation."
37 Blockades are established "to deny the enemy the use of enemy and neutral vessels or aircraft to transport personnel and goods to or from enemy territory." 38 If the Taiwan Strait was sealed off by the US Navy, it would be thus a belligerent operation against China, considering it as an enemy of the US. In fact, the main purpose of the blockade was to prevent China from landing on Taiwan, an important ground of strategic interest of the US in East Asia. Moreover, the US Navy's Seventh Fleet was disposed along the southeast coast of the continent. No wonder China would recognize it as 'grave threat' against her territorial integrity. Considering that Taiwan and Korea were closely connected with each other along the frontline between China and the US, eventually, the Chinese leadership decided to respond to the blockade of Taiwan by attacking the UNF in Korea with the military option, the other side of erupting USChina armed conflict in East Asia. 
B. No Declaration of War?
China did not officially declare war against the UNF. The absence of an official declaration of war would raise a question as to whether the CPVA carried out a lawful military operation or a certain hostile action. In the classical international law period, "a declaration of war by means of unequivocal expression of intention [to the other party] was required as one of the conditions of lawful war." 53 In modern times, however, "no particular form is required for the declaration of war. A conditional ultimatum, which calls upon the other party to bring about or remove a particular state of affairs within a period of time [or from a region] is deemed a kind of declaration."
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China actually delivered a series of 'conditional ultimatums' to the UNF, and 76 Following the conventional definition of war, the legal characteristic of the armed hostilities in Korea has not been accepted as a 'general war' by a conventional definition, but an internal 'civil war' or de facto war. 77 The "troop-contributing States" to the UNF regarded their military operations in Korea as 'police actions,' 78 while China maintained her armed intervention in the form of 'volunteers' to assist a neighboring country. China argued that no foreign force could properly intervene and the UN had no legitimate role in such a civil war.
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China carried out a dual strategy in Korea, i.e., separating military actions from diplomatic questions. The Central People's Government maintained a neutral status, while the volunteers' army conducted actual military actions against the UNF. China enjoyed these two grounds simultaneously. As China was seemingly neutral, the UNF avoided attacking Chinese territory directly, although there were several breaches.
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IV. Closing
In 1951, the Korean War reached an impasse such that both sides hoped to stop the armed hostilities. Truce talks began in July 1951 following the suggestion of J. Malik, the Soviet Union's representative to the Security Council. During the 2-year negotiations, both sides debated many subjects. The following are critical legal questions among them.
A. POWs
During the Korean War, 7,245 American soldiers were reportedly captured or interned by the communist side. Among them, 2,806 died in captivity, 4,418 were released to the US, and 21 chose to go to China. 81 More than 3,700 South Korean combatants were captured by the CPVA. 82 The UNF also captured about 20,000
CPVA. 83 The repatriation of POWs was a critical point at issue in the course of armistice negotiations between the two sides. It accordingly left many problems from not only a humanitarian, but also an international legal perspective. The POW question was heavily debated between the two sides. The negotiation went on for more than one and a half years. 
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There are three major legal questions regarding the POWs in the Korean War, especially in connection with the CPVA. The first is whether the CPVA fighters captured by the UNF qualified as POWs under international law despite of China's intervention into the Korean War without an official declaration of war by a volunteer army whose belligerent status was ambiguous under international law. Article 4 of the Geneva Convention III provides "members of volunteer corps" with POW status when captured "operating outside their territory." 88 To be a POW, such volunteers must fulfill the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, (c) that of carrying arms openly, (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 89 The CPVA combatants fully satisfied terms (a), (b), and (c); however, term (d) would be debatable. Considering that the CPVA determined to abide by jus in bello in the conflict and asked the UNF to do so, 90 the Chinese were supposed to follow the laws of war. Consequently, the captured volunteers might be qualified as POWs under international law. The second question is related to their repatriation conditions; whether their free decision of where to go should be respected. The communist side insisted on repatriating the POWs unconditionally to their home countries, 91 while the UNF side maintained that they should have a free right to choose where to go. 92 Both finally agreed to "repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture." 93 Those remaining prisoners of war, "who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody," would be handed over to "the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition." 94 The South Korean President, Syngman Rhee, however, was not satisfied with these conditions; he unilaterally released about 27,000 anti-communist POWs from its camps on June 18, 1953. 95 The truce talks reached a deadlock with his stunning political initiative, which has been both criticized and admired by the international community. This impasse was resolved by political compromise between the two sides and the ceasefire negotiation resumed. Both sides, however, debated again the interpretation of Article 118 of the Geneva Convention III, which provides that POWs should be repatriated 'without delay' after the cessation of active hostilities except for those who are under criminal proceedings for an indictable offence. The phrase, 'without delay' implies that belligerent parties should transfer POWs detained in each party's military control back to their home country immediately without applying any other terms than humanitarian considerations. 96 There is no possibility under international law for a detaining country to decide the final destinations of POWs according to ideology.
No example has been found in the past, either. A neutral country can accommodate only the wounded or sick POWs who might recover within a year if transferred or who might suffer serious harm from continued detention. 97 The Geneva Convention III refers only to "mental or physical fitness" as grounds for transferring POWs to a neutral country. 98 Such a new practice could be thus understood following the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), which respected the freedom of thought, conscience, and movement for everyone. 99 The third question is whether the POWs were treated appropriately under international law. Immediately after the armistice, the US raised the question of atrocities committed against the American POWs in the Korean War. On October 6, 1953, the US Senate established a special subcommittee, chaired by Senator Charles E. Potter, to inquire into the nature and extent of communist war crimes committed against American personnel during the war time. In total, 29 witnesses appeared before the subcommittee in public hearings on December 2, 3, and 4, 1953. Among them, 23 were American servicemen who were either survivors or eyewitnesses of communist war crimes. 100 Upon hearing the testimony of all witnesses and studying the documentary evidence submitted, the subcommittee advised that the North Korean and Chinese Communist armies were guilty of the following war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against American personnel during the conflict in Korea: At the first mass meeting, a Chinese indoctrinator assured the prisoners that he was not angry at them for being in Korea. He realized the Americans and others had been duped by warmongers and Wall Street imperialists. He assured the men that Chairman Mao had given orders they should be treated with fairness…. The barn in which they were indoctrinated was decorated with two Christmas trees, wreaths, candles, red paper bells and a sign: 'Merry Christmas.' …. The food would be a healthy combination of sorghum seed, bean curd, soya-bean flour, and cracked corn. For a Christmas treat, they were to receive rice, boiled fatty pork, candy, and peanuts….
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According to Toland's interview, the POWs were allowed to keep bibles and religious articles, and were even permitted to hold religious discussions. Clarence C. Adams, an American POW who chose to go to China also recalled the life in the camp: "There wasn't too much friction between prisoners and captors who were the Chinese."
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The lenient treatment of the CPVA to POWs in the Korean War may have been in keeping with Premier Mao's idea.
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Both sides have maintained diametrically opposite positions on the treatment of the American POWs during the Korean War. Wrapping up the debates, it was arguably not until mid-1951 that the CPVA started operating its POW policy according to international law, with the construction of permanent camps in the North. Some violations happened before then. The US Senate Report No. 848 does not contain any clear evidence that the CPVA 'alone' perpetrated wrongdoings against the POWs. Whether those confirmed violations before mid-1951 constituted 'war crimes' or, more specifically, 'crimes against humanity' is still legally controversial.
B. Signing the Armistice Agreement
The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed by three military commanders of the belligerents: (1) Mark Clark of the UNF; (2) Kim Il Sung of North Korea; and (3) Peng Teh-Huai of the CPVA. Because China did not officially declare war against the UNF, Peng Teh-Huai signed the Armistice as commander of the CPVA, which was "purely military in character," and whose primary objective was to stop the on-going armed hostilities. 113 The Chinese strategy was to separate military engagement from diplomatic reaction in the Korean crisis. The former was led by Peng Teh-Huai of the CPVA, while the latter was controlled by Zhou En-lai of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After signing the Armistice, Peng Teh-Huai came down from the stage and Zhou En-lai took over the role from a political dimension. This ambiguous position of China, however, would raise a question of legal uncertainty when the Armistice is replaced by a peace treaty. 114 On which legal grounds could China sign a peace treaty replacing the Armistice if she was not a belligerent and the CPVA no longer exists? The most reasonable and probable way would be such a package deal between the former belligerent parties concerned, the two Koreas, China, and the US, that the peace treaty has the effect of replacing the Armistice at the same time.
V. Conclusion
This article has investigated legal questions related to the CPVA, all of which are hidden, but critical issues for establishing a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The second part has addressed the international legal status of Chinese military engagement via the 'volunteers.' Considering the casus belli, just crossing the 38 th parallel of the UNF's beyond the authorization of the Security Council resolutions, the blockade of the Taiwan Strait, and the actual air attacks on Chinese soil, crossing the Yalu River would be qualified as 'self-defense,' given a strict meaning under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The third part has checked the aspects of actual armed hostilities between the two sides. Among the five offensives of the CPVA, the third and the fourth offensives were beyond the scope of self-defense under international law because the primary purpose of the Chinese armed intervention was to repel the UNF to south of the 38 th parallel. Armed attacks by the CPVA to south of the 38 th parallel could not be argued to be self-defense, just as those by the UNF to the north of the 38 th parallel were not legitimized without the authorization of the Security Council. The third part has discussed the closing stage of the Korean War. There were two legal questions in the negotiation table for armistice. One was the repatriation conditions of the POWs. In spite of long and harsh debates, they did not find the best solution, but made a political compromise leaving many critical questions untouched. Many visible and invisible problems shall be resolved in the course of their peacemaking now and in the future. The other was the legal status of the CPVA in the closing stage of the Korean War. Although China did not officially declare war against the UNF following the two-tier (military and diplomatic) strategy, the volunteers' status was recognized under international law as a belligerent party in the battlefield. Peng The-huai finally signed the Armistice Agreement as the military commander of the volunteers. When I took the undergraduate program at the University of Washington, Seattle, one of my professors who had a deep interest and wide range of theoretical and physical experiences in China complained: "Why is China so anxious about the stimuli along the northeastern part of her borderline?" I was quite embarrassed at such a misunderstanding of a top-level American political scientist regarding China, expected to be a rival of the US within a generation. While reviewing primary sources on the CPVA in the Korean War for this research, I got a similar feeling that, during the Korean War, the American leaders never understood China, either. Even today, I am afraid that policymakers in Korea and the US will have difficulties reaching a consensus with their Chinese counterparts. There is no future for people who easily forget lessons from past history. Hopefully, this international legal research on the CPVA can be a humble steppingstone to building permanent peace on the Korean peninsula.
